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Imagine a continent inhabited by ten billion people, all equally very well off, and call this 
state of affairs world A. Unknown to the people of the first continent, you may choose to 
populate a second continent with a group of the same size, each of whom will be worse off than 
the first group, but whose lives will still be worth living. This combined population, world A+, 
seems at least as good as A, if not better. Suppose that you can then redistribute so that you 
reduce each person’s utility on the first continent, but raise the utility of each on the second 
continent by a greater amount. The resulting population, B, contains 20 billion people, each of 
whose lives is of equally high quality, but not quite as good as those of the people in A or the 
better-off group in A+. Again, this seems an improvement. Finally, imagine that you repeat the 
process twenty-four times. Each step seems to lead to a better outcome. The result is a world 
with a huge population, Z, each of whose lives is barely worth living. If the relation “better than” 
is transitive, then it seems Z must be the best of all these worlds: what Derek Parfit calls the 
repugnant conclusion.
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Most of us agree that this conclusion is repugnant. But Z undoubtedly contains more 
utility. If we want to hold that it is worse, then we had better have a good reason. Some writers 
have suggested that A is lexically superior to Z: though the Z lives have value, no number of Z 
lives could be worth as much as a single life in A. Even if we adopt this view, however, it is hard 
to see how it could make the world worse to move from A to A+. It seems that creating lives 
worth living should, if anything, be good, if it has no effect on others. As Michael Huemer says, 
“Worthwhile lives are good. More of a good thing is better.”2 Once we have added the new 
people, it is hard to say why we should not redistribute—which both increases utility and 
benefits the worse-off—and move to B. On reaching B, there seems no reason not to move to 
B+…and on down the alphabet, leading to the paradoxical conclusion that Z must be better after 
all. Accepting that A could be lexically better will not enable us to avoid the repugnant 
conclusion. We must also solve the mere addition paradox.   
We might argue: 
1. It would be preferable to live one wonderful life in A+ than any length of time in B or Z, or 
any number of lives in B or Z in sequence; 
2. One superior A+-life is preferable to any number of B- or Z-lives; 
3. The value of a world is the sum of the desirability of its individual lives; 
4.  A+ is better than either B or Z. 
Even if we accepted premise 1, this inference would still be dubious. “In the interpersonal case,” 
as Jeff McMahan pointed out in an early review of the population ethics literature, “there is 
nothing analogous to the preference for a single [superior good] over any number of [inferior 
goods] on which to base the claim that a single life might contain more of what is valuable than 
any number of lives of a lesser quality.”3  
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McMahan presented this as a criticism of attempts to block the repugnant conclusion by 
appealing to lexical superiority. But in fact, the distinction between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal aggregation helps explain how the mere addition paradox arises. If it would be 
better to live any single life in one world than through any combination of lives in another, then 
we may safely infer that that the former world is lexically preferable, as if we were aggregating 
intrapersonally. Such lexical judgments involve the “suspension of addition”: the utility in the 
latter world, however great in quantity, effectively does not count. Such reasoning is defensible 
so long as welfare levels are uniform in each world. When, however, we compare worlds 
containing better- and worse-off people, it is no longer true that any life in the first world is 
better than any combination of lives in the second. The condition that allowed us to infer that the 
first world was lexically better and suspend addition is no longer met. When one pairwise 
comparison suspends addition, and the other does not, the result is the mere addition paradox. 
I. The Repugnant Conclusion and Intrapersonal Aggregation 
Could A really be better than Z? The repugnant conclusion may seem arithmetically 
inescapable. Though the lives in A are much better than those in Z, the sheer number of lives in 
the latter will ensure that they add up to more utility. Something similar, however, could also be 
true within a single life. Parfit asks us to imagine choosing between a hundred wonderful years 
of life, or a Drab Eternity in a world whose only pleasures are muzak and potatoes.
4
 Assume that 
each jingle and potato brings as much paltry pleasure as the first. Most of us would still pick the 
Century of Ecstasy. Why?  
One might think that the pleasures of the Century of Ecstasy are lexically better, in line 
with Mill’s claim that one good is superior if informed people prefer it to any amount of another. 
Parfit’s discussion suggests that he takes this view.5 But other writers lack this intuition, and 
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doubt that it is defensible. “Suppose we are offered the choice between living another minute in 
ecstasy and having another thirty drab years of muzak and potatoes,” comments Noah Lemos. “I, 
for one, would choose the thirty drab years.”6 More plausible is the claim that no amount of 
potatoes could be worth trading away a satisfactory life. Human welfare, as Dale Dorsey notes, is 
plural in nature: discrete pleasures and pains are important, but “global plans and projects” play a 
crucial role. More pleasure is better, other things being equal, but we have an overriding interest 
in our lives being good enough, satisfactory, a success. Whether a life succeeds or fails is not 
simply a matter of the sum of utility: we could coherently judge the life in the Drab Eternity a 
failure however long it lasted.
7
 Our judgments in such cases, as James Griffin writes, “take a 
global form: this way of living, all in all, is better than that.”8  
These claims are simplest to defend on a desire-utilitarian or objective list account of 
welfare. Hedonistic utilitarians may seem committed to summing pleasures and pains. Yet 
suppose you have a choice between the Century of Ecstasy and the Drab Eternity. You choose 
the Century of Ecstasy because it sounds like a greater pleasure. On your deathbed, you still 
think it was. Your guardian angel reveals that had you chosen the Drab Eternity, you would have 
regretted having done so. It seems that you could conclude that the Century of Ecstasy was a 
greater pleasure. On this preference-hedonist account, as Parfit puts it, “one of two experiences 
is more pleasant if it is preferred.”9 
Such a judgment involves what Griffin calls the “suspension of addition”: “the relevant 
notion of aggregation cannot be simply that of summing up small utilities from local 
satisfactions; the structure of desires already incorporates, constitutes, aggregation.” Griffin 
contrasts his approach with Parfit’s,10 but some of Parfit’s remarks are very similar. He too holds 
that on a “summative” approach, the Drab Eternity offers more utility, but that it does not offer 
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“a better life.” The Century of Ecstasy is superior “in an essentially qualitative way.”11 This view 
is controversial, but not obviously unreasonable.
12
 Moreover, it seems that we must accept that 
some goods can be lexically superior to others if we are to reject the repugnant conclusion. If the 
value of lives is simply the sum of their utility from moment to moment, then Z must be superior 
to A as a matter of simple arithmetic. If we claim that A is better than Z when both are taken as 
wholes, then, we necessarily suspend addition. 
Having argued that an individual could rationally choose the Century of Ecstasy, Parfit’s 
next move is to suggest that that this approach can be carried over to comparing the value of 
different populations.
13
 This argument is similar to C. I. Lewis’s proposal that in comparing the 
value of two objects, we should judge superior the one that gives rise to the set of experiences 
which we would prefer to live through in sequence.
14
 Rawls accused Lewis of “the conflation of 
all desires into one system of desire,” thus ignoring the separateness of persons.15 In a similar 
vein, Jesper Ryberg observes that 
[s]trictly speaking, Parfit's argument involves some kind of trick. It assumes that 
preferences with regard to comparison of life scenarios can be transferred into 
comparison of population scenarios. However, when we move from the intra-personal 
case to the inter-personal case there is nothing analogous to the preference of a single 
individual.
16
 
 It is true that we cannot assume that intrapersonal and interpersonal aggregation are 
equivalent. Nevertheless, in this case the trick seems justified. The lives in the Drab Eternity 
contain only the transitory pleasures of muzak and potatoes, not any “plans and projects” that 
attach to lives as a whole. If we stipulate that these mild pleasures never wear thin, but that they 
also never add up to any greater good, one could rationally be indifferent to experiencing them in 
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the course of one infinitely long life and a series of separate lives. And if anyone could rationally 
prefer a single life in A to eternal life— or any number of lives—in Z, then it would be very 
strange to claim that Z was the preferable world. We can plausibly hold that: 
5. If it would be preferable to live any single life in one world than to live through any 
combination of lives in another, then the first world is preferable for people. 
6. It would be preferable to live any single life in A than any combination of lives in Z. 
7. A is preferable to Z for people. 
8. Ceteris paribus, a world that is preferable for people is better simpliciter. 
When we say a world is preferable for people, we mean that is preferable for people de 
dicto. We compare possible populations of various sizes and compositions, and ask which set of 
lives would be most desirable, all things considered, if one were to live them end to end. The 
world we choose will be the one that is most desirable for people–as opposed to what might be 
desirable from some impersonal standpoint, such as one concerned with the just distribution of 
welfare—but not for any particular people. We are not deciding what would be preferable for 
some previously defined population de re. Some writers, to be sure, have held that we should 
consider only the interests of people who will at some point exist. But it is not clear how we 
could use this criterion to decide the optimal population size: the very point at issue is who 
should exist.
17
 Alternatively, we might take the group to be both actual and possible people. R. 
M. Hare held a version of this view.
18
 Hare maintains that we should aggregate what would be 
the retrospective preferences of all actual and possible individuals for having come into 
existence. This view is coherent, but it leads to the repugnant conclusion: the sheer number of 
people in Z who would retrospectively have a preference for having been born would lead us to 
judge Z more desirable than A.
19
 While to dismiss Hare’s view on this ground would beg the 
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question, it is fair to note that it has found few supporters.
20
 Since the very question we are 
deciding is which population would be best, the de dicto criterion seems appropriate, and has 
more intuitively plausible implications.
21
 
Even if World A is preferable for people, this does not prove that it is better. It might be 
that impersonal ideals such as equality or perfection affect the goodness of outcomes.
22
 But 
everyone in A is equally well off. Egalitarians can have no complaint. So far as perfection is 
concerned, World A is, of course, much better than Z. We can reasonably judge that 
9. Other considerations speak at least as much in favor of A as Z. 
10.  A is better than Z. 
This gives us prima facie grounds for rejecting the repugnant conclusion. But it does not 
solve the mere addition paradox. Let us see why. 
II. The Mere Addition Paradox and Interpersonal Aggregation 
Suppose we start at A, and try to decide which world would be best. Just as an individual 
may accept reductions in the quality of her life in order to increase its extent, we may improve 
the world by trading reductions of quality against increases in population. The place to stop, as 
Griffin suggests, may be part way through the alphabet.
23
 First, we should ask whether each 
individual would rationally prefer her present life in A, or a proportionately larger number of 
lives in B. If each would find the latter preferable, then we may conclude that overall B would be 
better than A, and move down the alphabet. Eventually, we will reach a point—say, world J—in 
which each would prefer a single life to any number of lives in K. Surely J will be better for 
people de dicto than K, or any world that comes after it. 
Life in J is good. Higher up the alphabet, life is better, but far fewer enjoy it. Further down 
the alphabet it becomes dreary, pinched, and at last hardly worth living. Now, suppose we can 
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add an equal number of new people, all with mean and impoverished lives. Because these lives 
are nevertheless (barely) worth living, and they harm no one, it seems that J+ should be at least 
as good, if not an improvement. We can plausibly claim that 
11. If two worlds contain the same number of satisfactory and equally good lives, and the 
second world contains additional lives that are unsatisfactory, but nevertheless worth living, 
then the second world is at least as desirable for people de dicto. 
12. J+ contains as many satisfactory lives as J, all of which are just as good, plus additional lives 
that are unsatisfactory but still worth living. 
13. J+ is at least as desirable for people de dicto as J. 
14. Ceteris paribus, a world that is at least as desirable for people de dicto is at least as good 
simpliciter. 
 Some may now question whether other things are equal. Though J+ is preferable for 
people, some might hold that its inequality makes it worse than J.
24
  Others might hold that the 
poorer lives make J+ less perfect, and therefore inferior.
25
 But both these views face compelling 
objections. Remember that mere addition makes nobody worse off. If we remain at J, the only 
effect on anyone’s welfare will be that people who could have enjoyed impoverished, but 
nevertheless worthwhile lives, lives which they would have been glad were created,
26
 will never 
come into existence. To judge J better than J+ on grounds of equality, when that equality benefits 
no one, seems pointless, if not downright perverse.
27
 Nor is it easy to see how mere addition 
would make the world less perfect when the original and new people will live on separate 
continents and have no contact with one another at all. To say that it would is like claiming that 
the presence of a Norman Rockwell in the local art museum would diminish the value of the 
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Mona Lisa.
28
 Why not hang the painting if people enjoy it? How could it reduce the world’s 
value if no visitor to the Louvre ever sees it? 
We can reasonably hold, then, that 
15. Other considerations speak as much in favor of J+ as J. 
16.  J+ is at least as good as J. 
Yet should we move to J+, we face a dilemma. If we redistribute, we will produce K. K is not 
better than J. Yet compared with J+, it “contains greater total happiness, greater average 
happiness, much more equality, and a much higher standard of living for the worst-off.”29 How 
could we decently refuse?  
It might seem that we could refuse. The superior lives in J+ are, after all, lexically 
preferable. One might think that this makes that world more valuable. Parfit considered but 
ultimately rejected an “elitist” solution to the mere addition paradox. Suppose some Europeans 
have lives barely well worth living, and some African children have lives that are barely worth 
living at all. If the former lives are lexically more valuable, it would make the world worse, on 
this view, to redistribute from the former group to the latter. “It is hard,” as Parfit observes, “to 
believe this.”30 Yet if we do not believe it, we face a paradox. We have judged one life in J more 
desirable—thus more valuable—than any number of lives in K. Hence J is a more valuable 
world. It seems that once we move to J+, these same lives should retain their value. The new 
lives in J+, while inferior, are worth living. If anything, they should increase J+’s value. 
Something here doesn’t add up. Why isn’t J+ also superior to K? 
The answer is that we can no longer suspend addition. Suppose we were to argue: 
17. If it would be preferable to live any single life in one world than to live any combination of 
lives in another, then the first world is preferable for people de dicto. 
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18. It would be preferable to live any single life in J+ than any combination of lives in K. 
19. Ceteris paribus, a world that is preferable for people de dicto is better simpliciter. 
20. Other considerations speak as much in favor of J+ as K. 
21.  J+ is better than K. 
This inference would clearly be unsound. First, premise 18 is false. To be sure, it would be 
preferable to live any privileged life in J+ than any number of lives in K. But for half the 
population in J+, it would be desirable to move to K. Each new person will have a strong 
preference for redistribution—probably stronger than that of each original person for preserving 
J+. Indeed, arguably that is what it means to say that K has more utility. We can no longer claim, 
in this new pairwise comparison, that the world with the privileged lives is preferable for people 
de dicto. Moreover, other things are no longer equal.  If we attach intrinsic importance to 
equality, or give greater weight to benefits that go to the worse off, then this is a further reason to 
consider K better. J+ is, to be sure, better in terms of perfection, but that can scarcely be decisive. 
Premise 20 is arguably false as well. 
 Indeed, it seems that we could defensibly conclude that 
22. If in two worlds with populations of the same size, one world has greater utility, then that 
world is preferable for people de dicto. 
23. J+ and K have populations of the same size, and K has greater utility. 
24. K is preferable for people de dicto. 
25. Ceteris paribus, a world that is preferable for people de dicto is better simpliciter. 
26. Other considerations speak at least as much in favor of K as J+. 
27.  K is better than J+. 
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 Choosing K will deprive each of the privileged people of a life she would value more than 
any number of K lives. Might it nevertheless be better to remain at J+? Even if we were tempted 
to believe this, we could modify the example. Taking inspiration from Parfit’s Second Paradox,31  
suppose that we can add to J, not just an equally large population, but rather a million times as 
many people, and suppose that redistribution can still produce K. Since a J life is preferable to 
any number of K lives, J will still be better than K. Since the new lives are worth living, J+ will 
still be at least as good as J. But this time it is undeniable that when we compare J+ with K, the 
latter will be preferable for people de dicto. Though each person would rather have one life in J+ 
than any number of lives in K, the smaller, privileged group’s preference for J+ could not be a 
million times as strong.  
“With one person,” Griffin notes, “the aggregation is to a large extent already incorporated 
in the individual's global desires, and there is nothing comparable to that framework in the many-
person case.”32 This does not pose a great problem so long as everybody has the same 
preferences, and everyone is treated the same. Suppose that every Italian prefers a single opera 
performance to any amount of beer. We can safely infer that if the government wants to benefit 
Italians and it is choosing between these options, then it should buy each an opera ticket. Yet 
nobody thinks that it would be preferable for Italians if we took away everyone’s beer money so 
that one more could attend the opera. Even if each has a lexical preference for opera, the 
collective desire of millions for beer will greatly outweigh one individual’s desire for Don 
Giovanni.  
Analogously, if a single life in J is preferable for any person to any number of lives in K, 
we can infer that J is preferable for people de dicto. We cannot say the same of J+ compared with 
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K. If we choose J+, half the population will gain and half will lose. Now, employing the Lewis 
method really would mean “the conflation of all desires into one system of desire.”  
III. The Suspension of Addition 
 The foregoing argument rests on five plausible premises: 
28. If it would be preferable to live any single life in one world than to live any combination of 
lives in another, then the first world is preferable for people de dicto. 
29. If two worlds contain the same number of satisfactory and equally good lives, and the 
second world contains additional lives that are unsatisfactory, but still all worth living, then 
the second world is at least as desirable for people de dicto. 
30. If in two worlds with the same population the second world has greater utility, then the latter 
world is preferable for people de dicto. 
31. Ceteris paribus, a world that is as desirable for people de dicto is as good simpliciter, and a 
world that is preferable for people de dicto is better simpliciter. 
32. Other considerations do not require us to revise our assessments of comparative goodness in 
the cases examined. 
When we compare J with K, the conditions in premises 28, 31 and 32 are met: J is lexically 
better. When we compare J with J+, the conditions in premises 29, 31 and 32 obtain, and we 
judge J+ to be as good as or better than J. When we compare J+ with K, premises 30, 31 and 32 
speak in favor of K. The result is an intransitive value judgment: J ≤ J+ <K <J.  
That transitivity has failed is not surprising. The judgment that J is lexically better than K 
involves the “suspension of addition.” We hold that though the K-lives have value, J is 
preferable for people de dicto, because no number of K-lives could be as desirable as a single 
one in J. The utility in K effectively does not count at all.  Comparing J+ and K, on the other 
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hand, we do not suspend addition. We can’t say that J+ is preferable for people de dicto, because 
for half the population, J+ would be the less desirable choice. When one comparison factors in 
the utility of the K-lives, and the other suspends addition, it is natural that we get intransitive 
results. 
 Many philosophers believe that intransitivity of value is impossible, or an incoherent 
concept. They must challenge one of the foregoing premises, or argue that their conditions have 
not been met.  One might deny that we can appreciate the value of a very long life or series of 
inferior lives,
33
 or question whether a single J-life that is clearly satisfactory would be preferable 
to any number of K-lives that are dubiously so. On this view, it would be imprudent to choose J 
over K, and the condition in premise 28 has not been met. One might contest premise 31’s claim 
that what is preferable for people de dicto is, ceteris paribus, better simpliciter. If, as R. M. Hare 
argues, we should consider what will be retrospectively desirable for all possible people de re, 
then K will be preferable to J. Finally, one might try to argue that premise 29, 30 or 32 is false, 
and that J is better than J+, or that J+ is better than K. 
 It is probably the first line of argument that has the best chance of success. The claim that J 
is preferable to K is based on the assumption that no amount of additional utility could be worth 
trading away a satisfactory life. The difference in the quality of the lives in J and K might, 
however, be slight. We could stipulate, following a suggestion by Gustaf Arrhenius, that the 
lives in each world are identical, except that each life in K contains an additional pricked 
thumb.
34
 Could we seriously consider it rational to prefer a single life in J to any number of 
worthwhile lives in K simply in order to avoid a once-in-a-lifetime thumb prick? Dorsey notes 
that a pricked thumb could cost an agent a “deliberative project,” and thus have a big impact on 
her life.
35
 Certainly we can imagine thumb pricks that would do this: pricking one’s thumb 
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while defusing a bomb could bring ruin. But to meet this objection we need only stipulate that 
the additional thumb prick in K has no effect beside brief and mild pain. How can we reasonably 
believe that such a thumb prick could make all the difference between a successful life and a 
failed one? 
 We can’t believe it—but then, the boundary between satisfactory and unsatisfactory lives is 
vague. Given the imprecision of our concept of a “satisfactory life,” it would be surprising if it 
were not. Surely there are clearly satisfactory lives, clearly unsatisfactory lives, and a vague 
zone in between. J might be the last world in the sequence in which lives were unambiguously 
satisfactory, while K might be the first of a number of worlds in which it was unclear whether 
life was satisfactory. How many worlds fall into this zone will depend on how fine we make the 
gradations between lives; if the difference is at the level of a single thumb prick, there might be 
very many. The result is a sorites paradox. It is hard to believe that one thumb prick could 
possibly make a significant difference, just as a dieter might doubt that a single chocolate bar 
could make a difference between being thin and being fat.
36
 Nevertheless, if we continue to add 
and redistribute we will move from J, where life is clearly satisfactory, to a world further down 
the alphabet where it is clearly not. 
 Such cases involve one value—pleasure from chocolate, utility—that can be measured in 
discrete units, and another, lexically preferred value—being thin, having a satisfactory life—
whose boundary is vague. The temptation, as Christopher Knapp has pointed out, is to focus on 
the fact that taking another chocolate or moving to K leads to measurable improvement on the 
first spectrum of value, while never leading to unambiguous deterioration on the second.
 37
 
Nevertheless, someone who gives priority to preserving his figure would do well to put aside the 
chocolates at a point while he is unambiguously thin—thin, to put it in the language of 
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supervaluationism, on all sharpenings of thinness. For the same reason, a rational agent should 
prefer a single life in J that is clearly satisfactory to any number of lives in K that may or may 
not be so. Since it may be unclear exactly where the vague zone begins, and her overriding goal 
is ensure a good enough life, she might also be wise to leave herself a margin of safety—
stopping, perhaps, at H.
38
 The important point is that we can defensibly hold that lives in J are 
lexically preferable to lives further down the spectrum. An ideal observer seeking the world 
most valuable for people de dicto would stop at the latest by J, even if the distinction between J 
and K is slight.  
 Some will insist that transitivity cannot fail in this way, since the transitivity of betterness 
is analytic.
39
 Suppose, however, that we understand the best outcome as “the outcome that, from 
an impartial point of view, everyone would have most reason to want, or to hope will come 
about.”40 If the alternative with which an option are being compared can justifiably influence our 
assessment of its value, then we may, as Stuart Rachels and Larry Temkin have argued, arrive at 
intransitive value judgments.
41
 Rachels and Temkin maintain that this could be because different 
factors could be relevant for making different comparisons, or the same factors might matter in 
different ways. I too am arguing that the choice of alternatives can affect the goodness of 
outcomes, but in a different fashion: by determining the populations de re whose interests must 
be taken into account. If the comparison is between J and K, we are choosing between 
populations of different sizes, and the best choice for people de dicto will be the lexically 
superior J. The choice between J+ and K, in contrast, requires us to compare outcomes for the 
same population, and what is best for people de dicto is the utility-maximizing K. 
 If transitivity of value can fail here, then it might fail in other contexts. At the same time, 
the combination of factors through which intransitivity has arisen—lexical superiority and 
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comparisons between outcomes for people de dicto that involve different populations de re—is 
unusual.  It may be peculiar to cases involving the creation of people. Those who worry about 
the implications of intransitivity can hope that the mere addition paradox is sui generis, and that 
“better than” is transitive in most, or even in all other cases. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The foregoing analysis has offered a new explanation of how the mere addition paradox 
arises. If we deny the repugnant conclusion, we must accept that some lives can be lexically 
superior to others. The most plausible explanation is that the former are better as a whole, 
however many discrete utility units the latter ones may contain. Such a judgment entails 
“suspending addition”: denying that inferior sources of utility, however numerous, can ever add 
up to a greater value than superior ones. Such lexical judgments are defensible when weighing 
sources of goodness within individual lives, or deciding the optimal number of people to create.  
There is no corresponding justification for suspending addition when weighing the interests of 
some people against those of others. Though creating people with poor lives has minimal value, 
helping people with poor lives has great value indeed. This explains our compelling intuition that 
it is better to redistribute to the worse-off group. 
 This paper has offered a new explanation for the mere addition paradox; it cannot claim 
truly to have solved it. That the relation “better than” could be intransitive remains deeply 
paradoxical. Yet the conclusion seems unavoidable so long as we think it justified to suspend 
addition when comparing some worlds, but not when comparing others. Future efforts to solve 
the paradox should start from a recognition of this point. 
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